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Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-19 
"Payment by owner to contractor - Subcontractor's lien 
not affected. When any subcontractor shall have 
actually begun to furnish labor or materials for which 
he is entitled to a lien no payment to the original 
contractor shall impair or defeat such lien; and no 
alteration of any contract shall affect any lien 
acquired under the provisions of this chapter•" 
Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-20 
"When contract price not payable in cash - Notice. As 
to all liens, except that of the contractor, the whole 
contract price shall be payable in money# except as 
herein provided/ and shall not b^ diminished by any 
prior or subsequent indebtedness, offset or 
counterclaim in favor of the owner and against the 
contractor/ except when the owner has contracted to pay 
otherwise than in cash, in which case the owner shall 
post in a conspicuous place on the premises a statement 
of the terms and conditions of the contract/ before 
materials are furnished or labor is performed/ which 
notice must be kept posted/ and when so posted shall 
give notice to all parties interested of the terms and 
conditions of the contract. An^ person willfully 
tearing down or defacing such notice is guilty of a 
misdemeanor• 
UUn) SIERRA NEVADA LUMB 
^Cfining of the paper made in 1880, It was 
SSyeri. wholly adopted by the parties tbere-
it^jrfThe agreement of 1880 was made to 
ijgtle the controversy existing between the 
|jjj£miiil8trator on the one side, and Thomas 
tn/l Ann Jenkins, on the other, and not be-
tween the minor and administrator as to 
"iSayr controversy between them, and it 
should be construed so as to carry out the 
objects of the parties. If the legal title to 
[the/Jots at that time was in the estate of 
John A. Jenkins, deceased, it descended to 
ISe heirs, subject to the right of administra-
tion and the payment of the debts of the 
deceased. It would be a fraud on the cred-
itors and upon the rights of the mother to 
agree to convey the title to the minor irre-
spective of their rights. Notwithstanding 
auch agreement of 1880, creditors would 
still have the right to have the property sold 
ito, pay the debts. The administrator re-
ported to the court that the agreement of 
1880 was not wholly adopted. The disputes 
kept up until the 1881 agreement was made. 
-Ann and Thomas Jenkins still remained In 
possession of the premises until after the 
agreement of 1881, so that it is probable 
that the intention of the parties in execut-
ing the agreement of 1880 was to settle the 
rjghts of the parties as to the ownership, 
and not to change the character of the own-
gphip from that of heir to that of grantee* 
Shey all agreed that the legal title was In 
the name of John A. Jenkins at the time of 
his death. If this was so, then Thomas 
and Ann Jenkins had no title they could 
convey to the plaintiff. In his inventory to 
the court In 1887 the administrator left out 
lots 1 and 1G, and did not claim them as be-
longing to the estate, and in his petition 
for the distribution of the real estate these 
lots were left out of the schedule. In the 
guardianship papers of the plaintiff the 
guardian, who is the mother of the plaintiff, 
claimed she was entitled to one-third of the 
Income of the farm in accordance with the 
Agreement In 1881, which claim was in-
consistent with the agreement of 1880. 
Since 1881 the administrator and guardian 
fcave~ acted under the agreement^of 1881, 
and have "practically ignored that' of -1880. 
In cases where the language used by the 
parties to a contract is Indefinite and am-
biguous, and hence of doubtful construction, 
the practical construction of the parties 
themselves is entitled to great, if not con-
trolling, Influence. Chicago v. Sheldon,. 9 
Wall. 54, 19 L. Ed. 594. It will be remem-
bered that Barnes was appointed adminis-
trator in 1879. At this time Thomas and 
Ann Jenkins were holding possession of the 
land adversely, and the statute of limita-
tions commenced to run. When the agree-
ment of 1880 was made, these parties were 
in possession. The actual change in the 
situation did not occur until 1881. The 
atatute was therefore running before the 
agreement of 1880, and continued to run 
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after that agreement was executed, so that 
the disability of the plaintiff, even if he 
could take title by the agreement of 1880, 
did not stop the running of the statute. The 
law is well settled that, when the statute 
of limitations once commences to run, it 
does not cease to run on account of any 
subsequent disability, unless such disability 
comes within the exception of the statute. 
13 Am. & Eng. Euc. Law (1st Ed.) 731, 732. 
The administrator or trustee having the 
right to commence suit for the recovery of 
the property within the time limited by 
the statute, and having omitted to do so, he 
is barred from commencing such action 
against the respondents, who are strangers 
to the estate; and his beneficiary is also 
barred, and his only remedy, if any, would 
be against the administrator and his sure-
ties. Whether such liability now exists we 
do n0t decide. 
The respondents also claim that the ap-
pellant is barred by reason of the com-
promise as evidenced by the agreement of 
1881, by which Thomas and Ann Jenkins 
gave up all claim to lots 2 and 3, and the 
administrator and guardian gave up to them 
all claim to lots 1 and 10, and that by re-
taining possession of lots 2 and 3 under 
such agreement and compromise, and assert-
ing title thereto, he must be held as con-
firming the compromise;' that he cannot re-
pudiate a contract made for his benefit, 
without returning the property in his pos-
session obtained by and through i t Inas-
much as this case has been determined up-
on other grounds, we forbear further dis-
cussion upon this subject. 
Th£ decree of the district court is affirm-
ed, with costs. 
BASKIN and BARTCH, JJ., concur. 
SIERRA NEVADA LUMBER CO. •. WHIT-
MORE. 
(Supreme Court of Utah. Dec. 5, 1901.) 
MECHANICS' LIENS — SUBCONTRACTOR — EX-
TENT OF LIEN—VALUE OP MATERIALS—CON-
TRACT PRICE—NOTICE TO OWNER. 
1. Under Rev. St. § 1372, providing that me-
chanics, material men, contractors, subcon-
tractors, etc., shall have a lien for the value 
of services rendered, in the absence of a spe-
cial contract fixing the value of the services, etc., 
the limit of the lien would be the reasonable 
value of the services. 
2. Rev. St. § 1372, provides that mechanics, 
subcontractors, etc., shall have a lien for the 
value of their services, etc. Section 1373 pro-
vides that in case of a contract between the 
owner and a contractor, the lien shall extend 
to the entire price, and that such contract shall 
operate as a lien in fa\or of all persons, ex-
cept the contractor, to the extent of the whole 
contract price. Section 1386 requires a sub-
contractor in his notice of lien to state the 
terms and conditions of his contract. Held, 
that tpe statute gives a subcontractor under 
a contract fixing toe price of the services, etc., 
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a lien, not for the actual value of his services 
or the materials furnished, but to the extent of 
the subcontract price within the limits of the 
original contract 
•^- 3. The owner in his dealings with the con-
\ tractor is charged with notice of the fact that 
\ the contractor has a right to subcontract, and 
I that the subcontractor is entitled to a lien | within the limit of the original contract price.1 
4. The owner has a right to retain enough 
of the original contract price to cover the lien 
of the subcontractor, and apply the same in 
satisfaction of such lien. 
5. Since the extent of the lien of a subcon-
tractor is the contract price, the owner of the 
premises on which a subcontractor files his 
lien is not entitled, in an action by the sub-
contractor to foreclose the lien, to a deduction 
for materials furnished the contractor and not 
used, it appearing that the building was finish-
ed in accordance with the contract with the 
owner. 
6. Where, in a suit to foreclose a subcon-
tractor's hen for $197 51, it appeared that the 
contiact price was $5,500; and that a sum paid 
by the owner to the contractor to be paid to 
such subcontractor had been applied ou an-
other account between the contractor and the 
biibcontractor, and it did not appear that the 
ow ner had paid the contract price, or that 
there was not enough remaining in his hands 
to pay the subcontractor's lien, a credit for 
the sum paid would not be allowed.1 
Appeal from district court, Salt Lake coun-
ty; W. C. Hall, Judge. 
Action b> the Sierra Nevada Lumber Com-
pany against Samuel M. Whitmore and oth-
ers. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, 
defendant Whitmore appeals. Affirmed. 
Bennett, Howat, Sutherland & Van Cott, 
for appellant Stephens & Smith, for re-
spondent 
BASKIN, J. This is an action to fore-
close a mechanic's lien. The appeal is upon 
the judgment roll from a deciee awarding to 
Jhe Sierra Nevada Lumber Company, re-
spondent, a lien for $197.51 and costs on cer-
tain real estate of the appellant and order-
ing a sale of the same to satisfy the lien. 
The trial court found: "That on or about 
the 31st day of August, A. D. 1899, the de-
fendant Samuel M. Whitmore, who was the 
owner of an interest In the property described 
j[njjie complaint ^entered Jnto a-coutract-witli* 
the defendant J. F. McLachlan for the erec^. 
*1ta!~by~said?McI&clhraH^^^ 
and others of a terrace of dwelling houses, 
described, for the sum of $5,500; that said 
property is situated in the city and county of 
Salt Lake; that between August 30 and De-
cember 9, 1899, the plaintiff sold and deliv-
ered to McLachlan certain materials, which 
were furnished for the building upon the 
premises described; that prior to furnishing 
said materials the said plaintiff, at the re-
quest of said McLachlan, made an estimate 
of what the said plaintiff would furnish the 
same for to the said McLachlan, which said 
estimate was itemized as to different ma-
terials, lumber, and millwork to be furnished, 
* Lumber Co. T. Partridge. 37 Pac 672, 10 Utah. 
121, 329. 
and the prices to be charged for ea< 
stated; that said estimate was made 
petition with other bidders, and ther< 
allegation or evidence of fraudulent 
charge; that McLachlan examined tin 
mate, and agreed to pay the plaintlffi 
amount thereof; that among the lte; 
furnished to the said McLachlan were 
flights of stairs and setting the same in pla! 
which, under the said estimate, were tof 
charged for at the rate of $125 for each k 
way, or $375 in all; that the said stair 
and the setting of them in place were of 
reasonable value of $80 each only, or $ 2 4 0 ^ 
all; that among the items so furnished to the' 
said McLachlan was a duantity of sheeting 
architrave molding, back band, quarter round 
and dimension timber, t ie price to be char-
ged and the amount which the said McLach-
lan agreed to pay fori which aggregates 
$78.02; that the said items last mentioned 
were delivered upon the said premises to tbfc 
said McLachlan to be used in the said build-
ing, but the same were never actually used 
therein, nor returned to plaintiff, and there*ft 
no evidence to show what became of it; thfct 
on October 23, 1899, the defendant Whitmore 
ga \ e to McLachlan the Sum of $100, to be 
paid to the plaintiff company on account of 
materials furnished for the building, but Mc-
Lachlan paid the same to the plaintiff, and 
caused the amount to be credited on another 
account; that plaintiff was not aware that 
said $100 had been paid by the defendant 
Whitmore to be paid on the said account btft; 
In good faith applied the said amount to th$ 
payment of another account of indebtedness 
of the said McLachlan to the plaintiff." The 
trial court refused to ^llow as a set-off 
against the plaintiff's claim the difference 
($135) between the contract price of the three 
flights of stairs and the sum found as the 
reasonable value thereof, $78.02, the contract 
price of lumber not actually used, and $100 
given to McLachlan to be paid to the plain-
tiff. 
1. Appellant Whitmore, contends that the 
$135 item should have been allowed as a 
-credit In his favor.on the ground that under 
the provisions of the mechanic's lien law of 
•this~state*TOev.~St:*-§ 1372) the respondent' 
was entitled to a lien only for the value of 
the materials furnished. Said section pro- \ 
vides that mechanics, material men, con-
tractors, subcontractors, etc., shall have a 
lieu \ * * for the vallue of service* ren-
dered, "labor done, or materials furnished, 
• • * whether at the instance of the 
owner or of any other pelrson acting by his 
authority or under him as agent contractor, 
or otherwise. This section, if it stood alone, 
would limit the lien of the original contractor 
and all other lienholders to the value of the 
services, labor, and materials performed and 
furnished. In the absence of a special con-
tract fixing the value of the services, labor, 
or materials, the law would imply an agree-
ment to pay what they were reasonably-
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worth, and in such instance their reasonable 
value would be the limit of the lien; but 
where there is an express contract between 
the owner and contractor by virtue of section 
1373, which provides: "In case of a con-
tract between an owner and a contractor, 
the lien shall extend to the entire price, and 
such contract shall operate as a lien in favor 
of all persons except the contractor to the 
extent of the whole contract price; and after 
all such liens are satisfied, then as a lien for 
any balance of the contract price in favor of 
the contractor,"—a different rule prevails, 
and in that case the lien, without regard to 
reasonable value, extends to, and is limited 
only by, the contract price. Such contract 
operates as a lien in favor of all persons 
who have, under either an express or implied 
contract with the original contractor, ren-
dered services, performed labor, or furnish-
ed materials; and the satisfaction of the lien 
of such person, If the sum secured thereby 
equals the original contract price, satisfies 
the lien under the original contract; other-
wise it satisfies said lien only to the extent 
of the sum paid in satisfaction of the lien 
of persons other than the original contractor. 
Section 1383 provides that "whoever shall 
do work or furnish materials by contract, 
express or implied, with the owner as in this 
chapter provided, shall be deemed an original 
contractor, and all other persons doing work 
or furnishing materials shall be deemed sub-
contractors." Section 1386 requires a sub-
contractor, in his notice of intention to hold 
and claim a lien, to state the name of the 
person by whom he was employed or to 
whom he furnished the materials; also the 
terms, time given, and conditions of the con-
tract. In the provisions of the statute cited 
the rights of a contractor to make subcon-
7 tracts is recognized. The owner, in his 
dealings with the contractor, is charged with 
notice of that fact, and that a subcontractor, 
by virtue of the original contract, is entitled, 
under his subcontract, to a lien, within the 
| limit of the original contract price. Lumber 
] Co. v. Partridge, 10 Utah, 322, 329, 37 Pac. 
572. The subcontract_ price may be less 
or greater " thati-the " V* ~ 
cende^^^aboi^iper^rmed^o^^p^grjp i» , ^"r-
nished. If much lessTTSTlne absence or rraW 
or mistake, certainly the subcontractor would 
not be entitled to a lien for their reasonable 
value; and, it much greater, in the absence 
of fraud or mistake, it follows that he would 
be entitled to a lien for the full subcontract 
pi ice, as it is the original contract which, 
under the statute, in cases like the one at 
bar, operates as a lien in favor of the sub-
contractor and is limited to the original 
contract price. The owner has the right 
In self-protection to retain enough of the 
original contract price to cover the liens of 
subcontractors, and apply the same in satis-
faction of such liens; but In no other respect 
relating to the subcontract price is the owner 
concerned. It was not the intention of the 
legislature to limit the Hen to the value of 
the services, labor, or materials in cases 
where there is an express agreement be-
tween the owner and contractor, but its in-
tention was to secure in such cases to a sub-
contractor under a subcontract made in good 
faith a lien far the subcontract price, within 
the lftnit of the original contract price. 
Counsel for the appellant cite in support of 
their contention Deardorff v. Everhartt, 74 
Mo. 37, and Laird v. Xoonan (Minn.) 20 N. W. 
354. Prom the first of these cases it appears 
that the Missouri statute did not, like ours, 
give a lien "for the contract price, but for 
the materials." From the second it appears 
that a subcontractor's lien under the Min-
nesota statute was for the amount of his 
just claim, and not "dependent upon or lim-
ited b.f the amount due the contractor from 
the o\|ner under the original contract, nor 
by the! state of the acoount between them." 
Neithe|r of these decisions is in point 
2. The appellant also contends that the 
$78.02 item should have been allowed in his 
favor, because the materials delivered to Mc 
Lachlan, the contractor, at the agreed price 
of said sum, did not go into the building or 
enhance the value of the estate, and there-
fore \yere not the basis of a lien under the 
provisions of the statute. Under section 1372 
of the Revised Statutes, all persons furnish-
ing materials to be used in the construction 
of a building are entitled'to have a lien. The 
trial court found that the materials in ques-
tion were delivered to said contractor to be 
used in said building. From the fact that 
subcontractors are granted liens by the stat-
ute, it follows that said section includes ma-
terials delivered to the contractor to be used 
in the building. The failure by the contractor 
to use the materials in the building did not 
injure the appellant, because the extent of 
the Men on his property was the contract 
price, which he was bound in any event to 
pay either to the contractor or the subcon-
tractor after the house was finished in ac-
cordance with his contract with McLacblan. 
3. Appellant contends that the $100 item 
should have been allowed as a credit in his 
1 inJUiniber_Co. v. Partridge, 10 Utah, 322-
of the plaintiff attached at the time the first 
materials were furnished to the^contractor; 
that Partridge, the owner, was bound to take 
notiqe of such lieu, and any payments made 
by him to the contractor after such lien at-
tached must be held to have been made at his 
risk and peril." In the case at bar the ma-
terials were furnished between September 30 
and December 9, 1S09, and the payment of 
the $100 was made October 23, 1890. The 
contract price for the building was $5,500. 
It was not alleged in the answer or found 
by the trial court that the owner has paid 
the contract price, or that there Is not re-
maining in his hands enough of the contract 
price to satisfy the lien of the respondent; 
SitKP'Of - the"-Berrices-pf avori—»Ii*"the-opinioiudeliver 
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•o that it does not affirmatively appear that 
the appellant has been injured by the failure 
to credit that amount on the account for ma-
terials furnished to the contractor. 
It Is ordered that the judgment be affirmed, 
and that the appellant pay the costs. 
MINER, C. J., and BARTCH, J., concur. 
HARRIS v. LARSEN et aL 
(Supreme Court of Utah. Dec. 6, 1001.) 
HOMESTEAD—EXEMPTION—BILL OF S A L E -
DEBT—PURCHASE PRICE. 
Where a purchaser of realty gave a bill of 
sale of certain hogs as a part of the purchase 
price, a judgment in an action for failure to 
deliver the hogs was for a "debt created for 
the purchase price of the land," within Rev. 
St. 1898, §§ 1150, 3247, making the land sub-ject to execution for such debts, though a 
homestead. 
Baskin, J., dissenting. 
Appeal from district court, Weber county; 
H. H. Rolapp, Judge. 
Action by Emma E. Harris against Henry 
Larsen and another. From a judgment in 
favor of defendants, plaintiff appeals. Re-
versed. 
N. J. Harris, for appellant 
ger, for respondents. 
M. D. Less in-
MINER, C. J. I do not concur in the opin-
ion of my learned associate, Mr. Justice 
BASKIN, in this case. Mr. Atwood sold the 
land to the respondents for $1,500, said sum 
to be*paid in cash and 16,000 pounds of hogs. 
All of the purchase price, amounting to $884, 
was paid, except something less than 16,000 
pounds of hogs. The hogs were to be re-
ceived as final payment of the purchase price 
of the land, in accordance with the bill of 
sale, but they were never delivered, and judg-
ment was obtained therefor, as part of the 
purchase price of the land. Executionjwas 
Issued on the judgment, and the land In ques-
tion was "sold thereon. The judgment was 
e"cution there-
for, under section JU56, Rev.^St. 1808,^which, 
anthorizes^a?5libmestead to be sold on execu-
tion in satisfaction of a judgment obtained 
on debts created for the purchase price there-
of. Section 3247, Id. This statute is very 
broad. Under our statutes, words and 
phrases are to be construed according to the 
context and the approved usage of the lan-
guage. Section 2497, Rev. S t 1808. A 
"debt" as defined by Webster, is "that which 
is due from one person to another, whether 
money, goods, or services; that which one 
person is bound to pay to another, or to per-
form for his benefit; that of which payment 
is liable to be exacted; due; obligation; lia-
bility." Anderson's Law Dictionary defines 
"debt" as follows: "In its most general 
sense, that which is due from one person to 
another, whether money, goods, or services; 
that which one is bound to pay or to perform 
for another." Novell v. People, 7 N. Y, 124; 
Kimpton v. Brohson, 45 Barb. 625. Bou-
vier's Law Dictionary defines "debt" to mean 
all that is due a man under any form of ob-
ligation or promise. City of Erie's Appeal, 
01 Pa. 402. Larsen agreed to deliver the 
hogs as a part of the purchase price of the 
land. They represented that part of the pur-
chase price that was not paid in cash. They 
were never delivered. Until delivered, Lar-
sen was owing the amount they represented 
on the land. Atwood had no vendor's lien, 
under the ordinary acceptance of that term, 
but he held a debt and obligation against 
Larson for the derjt represented by the hoga. 
Whether such debt was evidenced by a bill 
of sale of the hogs, upon which a partial de-
livery was made, or upon a verbal promise 
to pay, makes no difference. The debt and 
obligation existed, and it grew out of the sale 
of the land. That obligation was given for 
a part of the purchase price, and the statute 
gave. Atwood the right to levy his execution 
upon the homestead to satisfy i t as a debt 
created for the purchase price. A Judgment 
obtained upon a contract made in part pay-
ment of land is a purchase-price judgment, 
whether the promised payment was to have 
been paid in money, or by the delivery of 
chattels. Doubtless one object in framing 
the statute in question was to protect inno-
cent grantors from the fraud and deception 
of grantees who seek, through sharp prac-
tices, to rely on their homestead rights as a 
defense to the payment of a just debt or ob-
ligation created for its purchase. 
In my opinion, the judgment is not sup-
ported by the findings, and should be revers-
ed, and a new trial granted, with costs. It 
is so ordered. I 
I 
i 
BARTCH, J., concurs. 
_ BASKIN, J.~ (dissenting)r Tnls !s an action 
in ejectment. The <^ ase wa,g jTirtl wKhnt l t *i 
for a fteh+ created JV>r» a ^ a r t ^ f ^ e ^ m ^ m in favor of 
tie^efendantfigB33ie^on 1 f% (lQbUdfl "IflfH fW 
is whether the findings support the judgment 
,TlHMriaL*courttfound-"tbat onrJuly'IpiBffS? 
said R. A. Atwood executed a deed conveying 
said premises [described In the complaint] to 
defendant Henry Larsen; that the purchase 
price of said land was $1,500, of which $884 
was paid in cash, and that said defendants, 
Henry Larsen and Krlstine Larsen, gave 
said Atwood a bill of sale of 16,000 pounds of 
hogs as a final payment upon said premises; 
that said Atwood agreed to accept the said 
hogs as a final payment upon said land, hat 
that said hogs were not delivered to bimfi 
that said hogs were In the possession of said 
defendants at the time of the execution o£ 
said deed, and that there was no actual 
change of possession pf the same; that the/ 
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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this action is predicated on appellant's 
right to appeal from all final orders and judgments as a matter 
of right under Title 78-31a-19 of the Utah Code Annotated, 
amended 1985, and Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant brought this action in the Fifth Circuit Court, 
Salt Lake Department, to foreclose its mechanic's lien against 
the respondents1 real property and for recovery under the Utah 
bond law against the respondents/owners for failure to provide a 
bond. 
Judgment was granted in favor of the appellant on the bond 
law claims, but limited to an amount of $1,800.00. The 
limitation was based on the amount of the contract between the 
owner and the general contractor. Appellant's claim seeking 
foreclosure of its mechanic's lien and attorney's fees was 
denied. Denial was based on a finding that there was a verbal 
limitation on the contractor's authority to purchase materials 
outside his own inventory. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Do the facts, as proved at trial, support a finding of 
a verbal limitation or agreement not to use materials outside of 
the contractor's inventory? 
2. Under the facts of this case is a material supplier 
precluded from enforcing an otherwise valid lien against an owner 
because of a verbal limitation contained in the agreement between 
the owner and general contractor against using outside suppliers? 
3. Under the Utah Bond Law, is the language limiting 
recovery of a bond law claimant to the "prices agreed upon11 
interpreted as referring to the prices agreed upon between the 
owner and his contractor or, as appellant urges, is it the price 
agreed upon between bond law claimant and the general contractor 
or owner? 
4. Is there any basis under the facts as proved to support 
a finding that the contract or "agreed price11 was $1,800.00 
rather than $2,600.00 testified to at trial? 
5. Is appellant entitled to recover attorney's fees 
necessary to bring this appeal? 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
1. Mechanicfs lien statutes. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-3. Those 
entitled to lien -- What may be attached. 
Contractors, subcontractors and all persons 
performing any services or furnishing any materials 
used in the construction, alteration or improvement of 
any building or structure or improvement to any 
premises in any manner and licensed architects and 
engineers and artisans who have furnished designs, 
plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates 
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of cost, surveys or superintendence or who have 
rendered other like professional service, or bestowed 
labor, shall have a lien upon the property upon or 
concerning which they have rendered service, performed 
labor, or furnished materials, for the value of the 
service rendered, labor performed or material furnished 
by each respectively, whether at the instance of the 
Owner or of any other person acting by this authority 
as agent, contractor or otherwise. This lien shall 
attach only to such interest as the owher may have in 
the property. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-17. Costs-
Apportionment -- Costs and attorneys' fee to 
subcontractor 
As between the owner and the contractor the court 
shall apportion the costs according to the right of the 
case, but in all cases each subcontractor exhibiting a 
lien shall have his costs awarded to him, including the 
costs of preparing and recording the notice of claim of 
lien and such reasonable attorney's fee as may be 
incurred in preparing and recording said notice of 
claim of lien. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-18. Attorneys1 
fees 
In any action brought to enforce any lien under 
this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to 
recover a reasonable attorneys1 fee, to be fixed by the 
court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action. 
2. Bond law statutes. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 14-2-1. Bond to 
protect mechanics and materialmen. 
The owner of any interest in land entering into a 
contract, involving $2,000 or more, for the 
construction, addition to, alteration, or repair of any 
building, structure, or improvement upon land shall, 
before any such work is commenced, obtain from the 
contractor a bond in a sum equal to the contract price, 
with good and sufficient sureties, conditions for the 
faithful performance of the contract and prompt payment 
for material furnished, equipment and materials rented, 
and labor performed under the contract. This bond runs 
to the owner and to all other persons as their interest 
may appear. Any person who has furnished or rented any 
equipment or materials, or performed labor for or upon 
any such building, structure, or improvement, for which 
payment has not been made, has a direct right of action 
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against the sureties upon such bond for the reasonable 
value of the rented materials or equipment furnished/ 
for the reasonable value of the materials furnished, or 
for labor performed, not exceeding the prices agreed 
upon. This right of action accrues 40 days after the 
completion, abandonment, or default in the performance 
of the work provided for in the contract. 
This bond shall be exhibited to any person 
interested, upon request. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 14-2-2. Failure to 
require bond -- Direct liability — Limitation of 
actions. 
Any person subject to the provisions of this 
chapter, who shall fail to obtain such good and 
sufficient bond, or to exhibit the same, as herein 
required, shall be personally liable to all persons who 
have furnished materials or performed labor under the 
contract for the reasonable value of such materials 
furnished or labor performed, not exceeding, however, 
in any case the prices agreed upon. Actions to recover 
on such liability shall be commenced within one year 
from the last date the last materials were furnished or 
the labor performed. 
3. Constitutional provisions. 
None. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
During April, 1985, the respondents were making repairs and 
improvements to their carpet and furniture store located on State 
Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. The repairs were occasioned by 
roof damage resulting from heavy snow pack of the previous 
winter. (Transcript 131) 
The respondents were in the process of making these repairs 
when a customer, Mr. Roy Gurule, presented himself to the 
respondents and inquired about the work in progress. The 
respondent testified that Mr. Gurule told them, "I can save you a 
lot of money." The respondents testified that Mr. Gurule 
indicated he could save them a lot of money because he, "brought 
it [ceiling tiles and ceiling grids] in by the truckload, bought 
it direct and cut out the middle man.11 He Represented himself as 
a contractor who handled big jobs and who bought materials by the 
car load. (Transcript 132-133) 
At this initial meeting, based on the foregoing 
conversation, the respondents claim that a verbal agreement was 
reached for the purchase of the materials. The price was "around 
$2,600.00" to be paid in cash less credit for the repairs v/hich 
the respondents were making to a sofa for Mr. Gurule. 
(Transcript 133) 
The court found this agreement included a verbal limitation 
that the contractor was not to purchase outside his own 
inventory. 
Thereafter, the appellant, a supplier of sheetrock and 
ceiling tiles, was contacted by the contractor. Mr. Gurule 
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ordered certain materials to be used for improvements to the 
respondents1 property, (Transcript 107-108) Thereafter, between 
approximately the first of May and May 21 , 1985, sheetrock, 
ceiling tiles and light grids were sold by appellant to Mr. 
Gurule on his account for use in the improvement of the 
respondents1 property. (Transcript 106 and Plaintifffs Exhibit 
18) Mr. Gurule had an open account with the appellant which 
account was in good standing. (Transcript 109, 25-35 and 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 13) 
The various materials purchased through the appellant were 
either picked up at the appellant's warehouse by the son of Roy 
Gurule or delivered directly to the respondents' store by 
appellant's employees. (Transcript 51, testimony of Vales 
Bailey; Transcript 65, testimony of Teddy Gurule) The invoices 
were usually delivered with the materials and were subsequently 
mailed to Mr. Gurule. All invoices identified each purchase as 
being for the Mastercraft warehouse (the identification which was 
used for the respondents' store). (Transcript 8-24 and 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 2 through 12) 
The terms of the account with the appellant as set forth on 
the invoices and by prior history was that payment be made within 
30 days of delivery. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 13 and Transcript 31) 
The reasonable and fair market value of all materials provided on 
account, less credits for all returned items, was established as 
being in the sum of $3,327.00. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 18 and 
Transcript 96) This value represented the normal charges of the 
appellant for these materials. (Transcript 33) 
-7-
At approximately the end of May, 1985, prior to the 
recording of appellant's lien, the appellant contacted the 
respondents by telephone to request that he make payment to the 
contractor (Mr. Gurule) and the appellant by joint check. The 
respondents replied that he had already paid the contractor one 
payment. (Transcript 105 and 134-135) 
Shortly thereafter, the contractor unlawfully took checks 
belonging to the respondents and forged^  the signatures or 
otherwise was able to negotiate the instruments for cash. No 
further payments were made by the respondents to the contractor. 
Eventually, the stolen funds were repaid to the contractor. 
(Transcript 112) 
Appellant caused a lien to be recorded on June 7, 1985, for 
the sum of $3,435.17. This amount was the amount owing at the 
time of the filing of the lien. Said lien Was properly notarized 
and otherwise stipulated to at trial to have met the statutory 
requirements. (Transcript 28 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 14) Notice 
of the lien filing was sent to the respondents by certified mail 
as required by statute and demand for payment was made by 
appellant's attorney. (Transcript 29 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 15) 
When no payment was made, this action was commenced. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. The facts do not support a finding of an agreement or 
limitation on the contractor's agency. 
II. Materials were supplied at the instance of a person 
acting under authority of the owner. 
III. The measure of damages under the bond law should be the 
contract price between the material supplier and the general 
contractor or owner. 
IV. The amount awarded under the bond law is contrary to 
the uncontradicted testimony at trial. 
V. Appellant is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's 
fees necessary to bring this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE FACTS DO NOT SUPPORT A FINDING OF AN 
AGREEMENT OR LIMITATION ON THE CONTRACTOR'S AGENCY 
Appellant urges that the facts do not, even in the light 
most favorable to the respondent, support the court's finding 
that there was only limited authority granted to the contractor. 
All of the evidence consists solely of the testimony of the 
respondent William Call. There were no other witnesses who 
testified to the "agreement.11 
The testimony is set forth in its entirety on pages 132-136 
and 138-139 of the transcript (see Addendum). 
The entire conversation recites the "puffing" of Mr. Gurule. 
There is no testimony that Mr. Call, a knowledgeable businessman, 
told the contractor that he accepted these claims as a binding 
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limitation. The only statements of a definite and restrictive 
nature are the replies to counsel's leading questions which 
relate to the representations and do not pertain to the contract 
or agreement. 
On his own, Mr. Call testifies to being "under the 
impression" that he got this out of some warehouse or that he 
brought it in by truckloads. The evidence concerning the 
agreement was that Mr. Gurule would do the work for a low price. 
The limitations were not part of the agreement. 
Elsewhere, it was testified that this "big contractor" was 
on this small job regularly and did some patching himself with 
his son. (Transcript 75) Also, the respondents1 own employee 
testified at two occasions that he knew the materials came from 
appellant because the respondent and hip son told him so. 
(Transcript 119 and 125) 
Further, the appellant testifies that he called Mr. Call, 
and his bookkeeper also called. No mention of the limitation was 
raised at these conversations. Thus, this circumstantial 
evidence contradicts the claim of limited authority. 
There is no creditable evidence that there was a meeting of 
the minds restricting the contractor's authority. 
II. 
MATERIALS WERE SUPPLIED AT THE INSTANCE 
OF A PERSON ACTING UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE OWNER 
Assuming that there was sufficient evidence for the court to 
find a limitation on the authority of the cpntractor to purchase 
materials outside of his own inventory, does this limitation 
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between the owner and his contractor prevent the material 
supplier from relying on the protection of the mechanic's lien 
law? 
The statute itself is very broadly worded. It provides: 
Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing 
any services or furnishing any materials used in the 
construction, alteration or improvement of any building 
or structure or improvement to any premises in any 
manner; . . . shall have a lien upon the property upon 
or concerning which they have rendered services, 
performed labor or furnished materials, for the value 
of the service rendered, labor performed or material 
furnished by each respectively, whether at the instance 
of the Owner or of any other person acting by this 
authority as agent, contractor or otherwise. Section 
38-1-3, U.C.A. [Emphasis added.] 
Thus, the specific question is whether the respondent 
provided materials "at the instance of the owner or any other 
person acting as agent, contractor, or otherwise." The answer is 
immediately both yes and no. 
Yes, the materials were ordered from the appellant by a 
person who was engaged by the respondent/owner as his agent to do 
the work. No, in ordering from the appellant he was not acting 
within his authority and not within his agency. The correct 
answer is not found in the language of the statute, but in cases 
interpreting it. An analogous situation involves the authority 
of a lessee to encumber the fee simple estate by contracting for 
improvements to the real property. 
In Interiors Contracting, Inc. vs. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382 
(Utah 1982), the liability of a lessor for contracts made by a 
lessee for improvements to real property owned by the lessor was 
addressed by the Utah Supreme Court. The principle question of 
law is identical; i.e., was the agency between the lessor and 
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lessee limited in such a way so as to preclude lien liability 
against the lessor's fee interest? 
The written lease between the lessor and the lessee 
expressly required that all improvements be made at lessee's 
expense and that the lessee promptly pay all contractors and 
materialmen. But, the court said this express limitation of 
authority in the lease "cannot override the effect of the 
mechanic's lien law as to persons not a party to the lease, 
Metals Manufacturing Company vs. Bank of Commerce, 16 Utah 2d 74, 
395 P.2d 914 (1964)." Thus, the limited agency between the owner 
and his agent was not the deciding factor. Rather, the court 
looked to the benefits conferred, participation of the lessor, 
and other factors so "it can be said with justice that the lessee 
in such case is acting for the lessor." Ibid, at 1387. 
Thus, if an expressed limitation in a lease cannot, per se, 
protect a lessor from lien liability, 4 fortiori, a verbal 
understanding based on representations from a contractor cannot 
limit the lien liability of an owner against materialman who, in 
good faith, supplied products to that contractor. Instead, 
looking at benefits conferred and other factors, it can be 
concluded that the limitation is not valid or controlling, but 
that the owner established the agreement, received the benefits, 
and therefore authorized the work. 
In Frehner vs. Morton, 424 P.2d 446, 18 Utah 2d. 422 (1976), 
an owner gave his daughter permission to direct construction of a 
residence for herself and her children on land that he owned. 
She hired a landscape architect he disliked and the owner refused 
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to pay on the ground that he had not authorized the work. The 
court found that he had nevertheless allowed the work to be done 
without objection and had impliedly approved the work. The court 
found that his consent to allow his daughter to proceed to direct 
the work included consent to have the landscaper do the 
landscaping. 
The court looked to the facts which were reasonably inferred 
from the circumstances as the basis for determining the consent 
and authority granted to the daughter to engage the plaintiff. 
A few other jurisdictions have addressed this question. 
They have generally said that the consent required by a lien 
statute is a consent that a party have authority to commence the 
work and that the statutes do not require specific consents as to 
the price, the specific nature of the work, or a consent to lien 
for the work. In Viccory v. Richardson, 75 N.E. 136 (Mass. 
1905), the court analyzed a case where the owner claimed that the 
architect had been given express limitations as to the amount of 
money that he was authorized to spend for the improvements. The 
architect had, contrary to these express instructions, authorized 
a contractor to build for an amount in excess of this authorized 
limit. The court said: 
It is claimed that this implied authority, although it 
empowered him to make such contracts, did not confer 
any authority binding the respondent to pay an 
increased price, as he was limited to the amounts 
specified in the contract with himself. This would be 
true if the petitioner sought to recover in an action 
of contract where there was no evidence of ratification 
. . . until informed to the contrary, she was supposed 
and believed that the petitioner was building the house 
for the original price. The consent given, however, is 
to the performance of the work, not to lien, or the 
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amount for which, under it, the interest of the owner 
in the land can be charged^ [Emphasis added.] 
The foregoing ruling comports with the analysis under the 
Utah lessor/lessee cases and Frehner. By{ such analysis, it is 
apparent that the contractor (in this qase Mr. Gurule) had 
authority within the requirements of the lien law to obtain 
materials, make certain repairs and install the materials on the 
premises. Whether the consent was limited or not, such 
limitation, if any, cannot override the intent of the lien law. 
The only possible exception to the foregoing conclusions 
would be if the appellant knew or should have known of a 
limitation (assuming one existed) in the parties1 contract. 
However, the authority of the contract was, to the appearance of 
third parties, unlimited authority to contract for the work. 
There was nothing unusual about the parties1 conduct or 
relationship. 
Clarey Haulk was called by the respondents at trial and 
testified that during the construction he was an employee of the 
respondent and that he knew the materials were supplied by the 
appellant, Claron Bailey. Mr. Haulk testified that when the 
materials were delivered to the job site by Ted and Roy Gurule 
(the contractor and his son) that they told him the materials 
were from the appellant. (Transcript 119) This same witness 
testified that when certain materials were returned, that it was 
his understanding that the materials were Igoing back to Claron 
Bailey and that this understanding was based on representations 
made to him by the respondent, Bill Call, and his son, Mike Call. 
(Transcript 125) 
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The testimony of appellant's employee and bookkeeper, 
Lynwood Christensen, the testimony of appellant and the testimony 
of Vales Bailey each stated that copies of the invoices were 
given to the person picking up the materials or were left with 
the materials when they were delivered, and that each invoice 
stated on it that the materials were provided for the Mastercraft 
warehouse or indicated that they were on appellant's forms. (See 
Transcript cited in Statement of Facts) None of the invoices 
were on a form or invoice from the contractor, Mr. Gurule. 
This testimony is consistent with the normal and usual 
course of business dealings between contractors and suppliers. 
There is no testimony that this limitation or understanding as to 
where the materials were to come from was made known to the 
appellant or would, under reasonable course of business dealings, 
have been known to the appellant. 
The decision of the court below granting the owner the right 
to verbally limit the authority of his contractor without notice 
to a material supplier creates an impossible condition. The 
supplier would need to obtain contrary confirmation from an owner 
in each job for which he is asked to supply materials. 
Otherwise, owners could routinely provide in their contracts that 
contractors would obtain materials only from certain parties or 
only for certain prices and, thereby, defeat the statutory rights 
of these parties to claim liens. 
Such is obviously not the intention of the legislature in 
establishing the lien law. As was stated in Interiors 
Contracting, supra, the purpose of the Utah Mechanic's Lien Law 
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is to "provide protection to those who enhance the value of the 
property by supplying labor and materials . . .we construe the 
lien statutes broadly to effectuate th^t purpose.11 Ibid, at 
1386. 
The Utah Court has also repeatedly stressed that the statute 
is to be interpreted broadly to the favor of lien claimants. As 
stated in Rio Grande Lumber Company vs. Darke, 50 U. 144, 167 
P.241: 
The aim and purpose of the Utah Mechanics Lien Law is 
to protect, at all hazards, those who perform the labor 
and furnish the materials which i enter into the 
construction of a building or other improvement, 
although the owner of the premises is most likely to 
suffer. [Emphasis added.] 
III. 
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES UNDER THEJ BOND LAW 
SHOULD BE THE CONTRACT PRICE BETWEEN THE 
MATERIAL SUPPLIER AND THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR OR OWNER 
The third issue raised is the amount of damages for v/hich a 
plaintiff is allowed recovery for improvements supplied when an 
action is brought under the bond law. The specific language of 
the statute states: 
[A] person subject to the provisions of this chapter, 
who shall fail to obtain a good and sufficient bond, 
shall . . . be personally liable to all persons who 
have furnished materials or performed labor under the 
contract for the reasonable value of such materials 
furnished or labor performed, not exceeding, however, 
the prices agreed upon. U.C.A. 14,-2-2. [Emphasis 
added.] 
The question before the court is the meaning of the language 
"prices agreed upon." 
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Similar language appears in Section 14-2-1 where it says: 
[S]uch bond shall run to the owner and to all other 
persons as their interests may appear; any person who 
has furnished materials or performed labor for or upon 
any such building, structure, improvement, payment for 
which has not been made, shall have a direct right of 
action against the sureties upon such bond for the 
reasonable value of the materials furnished or labor 
performed not exceeding however in any case the price 
agreed upon. 
The language in both sections is identical. In both 
instances the "price agreed upon11 is contained in a sentence 
devoted to the rights of materialmen. There are no Utah cases 
interpreting this language. 
Appellant argues that this language should be interpreted 
with a meaning consistent with the general practice in the 
construction industry. 
A materialman or laborer would usually bid or agree to 
supply labor or materials to a general contractor for a certain 
price. The general contractor then agrees to perform that work 
and usually additional work for an owner upon a lump sum bid or 
agreed price which would be the sum of other material and labor 
prices plus a provision for overhead and profit. It is a rare 
case such as one before the court where the amount of a 
materialman's bid and the general contractor's bid are for almost 
the same work and same materials. It is also unusual that the 
general contractor price is lower than the materialman. 
The interpretation of the court below would give the 
supplier the right to recover the profit and overhead of the 
general contract in addition to his own overhead and profit. 
Such an interpretation does not make sense. Rather, it is 
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logical that the legislature intended that the supplier get what 
he bargained for and nothing more. 
A further reason for favoring this construction is that the 
materialmen and laborers whom the statute has been designed to 
protect have no control over the contract between the general 
contractor and the owner. The general contractor may agree to 
provide labor or materials at a price below that for which the 
labor or materialman have agreed to work. The reasons for such 
an offer may be as an inducement for the work, to assist cash 
flow, or may be the result of a mistake or misrepresentation on 
behalf of the general contractor. It is not fair or consistent 
with the statutory purpose to limit the materialmen or laborerfs 
recovery to this false price and thereby prejudice the 
materialman or laborer for such negligent or misleading acts by a 
general contractor. 
In this case, the contract is the result of an extremely low 
price being offered to induce the owner's assent. It flies in 
the face of the statutory purpose to limit the respondents, who 
in good faith supplied materials, to a prilce less than the fair 
market value evidenced by the material supplier's price. 
IV. 
THE AMOUNT AWARDED UNDER THE BOND LAW IS 
CONTRARY TO THE UNCONTRADICTED TESTIMONY AT TRIAL 
The judgment entered by the court was for $1,800.00 based on 
an interpretation of the law (opposed above in III) that the 
contract of the owner limited the amount of the bond claim. 
-18-
However, the testimony was that the contract was for 
$2,600.00. (Transcript 133 and later at 141) 
The sum of $1,800.00 was never mentioned during the trial. 
It is undisputed that the appellant received no compensation from 
the owner or contractor, and so there is no basis for a judgment 
of less than $2,600.00, even under the respondents1 theory of the 
law. 
The case was tried on two occasions, separated by a long 
delay, and final motions argued months later. The court was 
likely confused without benefit of a transcript. 
V. 
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER REASONABLE 
ATTORNEY'S FEES NECESSARY TO BRING THIS APPEAL 
At trial, the appellant introduced testimony in support of 
his claim for attorney's fees sought under the provisions of the 
mechanic's lien law. The appellant renews its request for 
attorney's fees as made at trial and those associated with this 
appeal in the event it is successful in its claim under the lien 
law. 
It is undisputed that the lien was proper and timely filed 
and that notice as required by the lien law was given to the 
respondents. Utah Code Annotated 38-1-18 clearly provides: 
In any action brought to enforce any lien under 
this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to 
recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the 
court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action. 
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Th is language unambiguously entitles the appellant to 
recover his attorney's fees as part of his award if this action 
is successful. 
Appellant has been required to pursue this appeal in order 
to secure his lien rights as set forth by the statutes and should 
be entitled to recover the costs of such Appeal as provided for 
by the same statutes. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant should be entitled to recover under the mechanic's 
lien claim as set forth in its complaint. The court has 
previously found no defect in the appellant's compliance except 
for the issue of agency. No other defects ^re appealed. 
The court should look at the apparent qonsent granted by the 
owner to his contractor to proceed with the work and should not 
prejudice the appellant on the basis of an undisclosed limited 
aspect of that agency which is contrary to the reasonable 
expectations of the parties. 
In addition thereto, the appellant should be entitled to 
recover under the bond law for the amount of his invoices or the 
reasonable value of the materials supplied. Appellant's recovery 
should not be limited by the amount of the respondents' contract 
with the contractor which was based on a grossly underbid 
proposal made to induce the respondents into purchasing from him. 
Such interpretation would be contrary to the express purposes of 
the statute. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of November, 1987. 
^U0K.< 
Steven F. Alder 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that -<er true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant was HUH Imir to John W. Call, attorney 
for defendants/respondents, at 320 South 500 East, Salt Lake 
City, UT 84102, postage prepaid, this day of November, 
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expressed interest 
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A I think he was in to have a sofa redone or something 
like that. 
Q Okay. Back to the conversation you began to 
describe. He said that he saw that you were remodeling, that 
he could save you a lot of money? 
A Uh huh. 
Q Before you responded, did he say anything else? 
A I told him—no, I told him that we'd already 
contracted the job, as far as— 
Q Who had you contracted with? 
A Roy—I forgot the last name, the guy that did it, 
did the labor, 
Q What did Mr. Gurle tell you fae could save you money 
on? 
A On the tiles and the grids and the whole thing and 
the drop ceiling. 
Q Did he tell you why he could save you money? 
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 A Yeah. He said he brought it in by the truckloadf 
2
 bought it direct and cut out the middleman. 
3 Q Did he tell you what kind of business he was in? 
4
 A Yeahf he's a contractor. He handled big jobs, 
5 bought materials by the carload. 
6 Q Subsequent to that conversation, did you enter into 
7 an agreement with him to supply materials? 
8 A No. Prior to that? 
9 Q Prior—well, prior to that time, you had not, he 
10 was just talking; but subsequent to that conversation, did you 
11 eventually enter into an agreement with him? 
12 A Yes, uh huh. 
13 Q Would you tell the Court to the best of your 
14 recollection what the terms of that agreement were? 
15 A Well, he was going to get me a good deal on the tile 
16 and the grid, at so much per foot that—that sounded pretty 
17 attractive to us, I think it was 39C a square foot. 
18 Q And did he give you a total price as to what these 
19 materials would cost you? 
20 A Yeah. We figured it up, there. 
21 Q And how much was that, do you know? 
22 A As I recall, it was around $2,600. 
23 Q How were you going to pay him for that? 
24 A C a s h . 
25 Q A n y t h i n g e l s e ? 
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1 A And well, of course, I—I can't recall if it was 
2 after that we decided to make a deal 0^1 trade on doing his sofa, 
3 too. He had a very fine sofa. 
4 Q Did Mr. Gurle make any statements to you about where 
5 he was going to get his material, otheif than the one you—the 
6 statement you've already described? 
7 A Well, he said he supplied all his own. He brought it 
8 in by the truckload and he—that's—and he warehouses it here. 
9 Q Did he ever— 
10 A He represented himself as a big contractor. 
11 Q Did he ever tell you that his—any of this material 
12 would be supplied locally? 
13 A No. Absolutely not. 
14 Q Did you give him any authority to purchase any 
15 materials locally? 
16 A No. 
17 Q Did you have any idea at any time prior to the filing 
18 of the lien in this case, and any subsequent correspondence, that 
19 he was obtaining materials locally? 
20 A Oh, I found out before the lien was filed, yeah. 
21 Q When did you find out? 
22 A I think Claron Bailey calle<$ me. 
23 Q Do you recall when that was? 
24 A No, I can't recall; but it was prior to the lien 
25 because Claron and I discussed the situation quite thoroughly 
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in regarding payment, whether LeRoy was going to pav for it or 
what the situation was. 
Q Was that after the last materials had been supplied? 
A Yes. 
Q When you talked to Mr. Bailey and discussed this 
matter, prior to that time, had you paid Mr. Gurle any money? 
A Oh, yes. Yeah. 
Q How much did you pay him? 
A I think the first check was $1,600. I don't recall 
whether the second was 600 or 400. In checks. I took him over 
to my bookkeeper over at the offices and had her write out the 
check to him. 
Q Prior to that time, had you had any contact whatsoever 
with Claron Bailey or anyone representing Claron Bailey? 
A I didn't even know the name Claron Bailey. 
Q After you'd written these checks— 
A You mean at the time I wrote the checks; right? 
Q Yes. 
A No. I didn't know Claron Bailey. 
Q After the material had been supplied and you spoke 
with Mr. Bailey, can you tell the Court what the gist of your 
conversation with him was? 
A Well, whether or not LeRoy—Mr. Bailey said that 
LeRoy hadn't paid him, when I talked to Mr. Bailey. And see, I 
never received any bills from Claron Bailey until after we had 
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1 paid LeRoy Gurle. 
2 Q How did you know what amounts to pay LeRoy Gurle? 
3 A He told me. And it seemed reasonable, and I paid him. 
4 Q When Mr. Bailey talked with you, you're saying then 
5 that that's the first time that you had Any inkling that the 
6 material had been supplied through Claron Bailey? 
7 A Is when I talked to Claron Bailey, yeah. I think 
8 there was something about—I asked LeRoy about when they delivered 
9 that—the egg crates, I says I can't use it, that doesn't do the 
10 job. Or no, we were trying to get the egg crates, I think it was, 
11 and he told me they had to be shipped in. 
12 Q Up until the time that you spoke to Claron Bailey 
13 after May 21st, some time between May 21st and May 31st, you had 
14 no idea what the source of the material was, other than what Mr. 
15 Gurle had represented to you; is that— 
16 A That's right. I did not know that he was doing 
17 business locally. I was under the impression that he got this 
18 out of some warehouse, that he brought it in by the truckload. 
19 Q I'll ask you to refer to the pictures in front of 
20 you; does that represent—do those pictures show one spot in the 
21 south showroom? 
22 A Uh huh. 
23 Q Now, has there been any other sheet work—sheetrock 
24 work done on any other portion of your building during that 
25 period of time? 
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Q Mr. Call, finally, prior to this time, you have-
do you recall what amount you've been billed by my office for 
representing you in this matter, prior to today? 
A Oh, I think it's probably—prior to today, on this 
case? 
Q Yes. On this case. 
A I'd say probably eight or $900, something like that. 
MR. CALL: That's all I have, your Honor, other than 
a proffer of my own attorney's fees, at the conclusion of our 
case. 
THE COURT: You may cross-examine. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. ALDER: 
Q 
of money? 
A 
Q 
fixtures 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
bid— 
Q 
You say Mr. Gurle told you he could save you a lot 
> l 
Uh huh. 
Had you previously received a bid for the light 
and the ceiling tiles and sheetrock? 
Yes, 
And who had you received that bid from? 
I don't recall. 
Did you compare Mr. Gurlefs bid— 
Well, the—the guy that supplied the labor gave us a 
Do you recall— 
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1 A —for the labor and the tile and the whole bit. And 
2 I believe it was— 
3 Q Well, let me—I don't want to know what the total— 
4 A You don't want to know what i t — 
5 Q What I would like to ask i$, did you compare the 
6 amount of that bid for materials with the bid that Mr. Gurle 
7 gave you for materials? 
8 A Well, yes. Of course. 
9 Q And did you save a lot of money? Did he give you a 
10 good price, based on the price he submitted? 
11 A Based on the price, it was very attractive. 
12 Q All right. And was that the main thing that you 
13 were concerned with, or were you concerned that he got it from 
14 I out of town or in town? 
15 A Well, the whole thing— 
16 Q In other words, whether he got it from out of town 
17 or in town, did you care if the price was good? 
18 A Well, the reason he told me he could give it to me 
19 at that price is that he brings it in by the carload, so it made 
20 sense to me, and I—I bought it. 
21 Q Was it substantially less? 
22 A Yeah, quite a bit, yeah. 
23 Q And then later, he said he'd have a sofa redone? 
24 A Uh huh. 
25 Q Do you remember/ did you ever give him a value as to 
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